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RightA PACIFIC CURRENCY AREA = A NEW APPROACH 
TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 
By KIYOSHI KOJIMA* 
I. International Monetary Problems 
As important world traders, Pacific countries were greatly disturbed by the series of 
international monetary manoeuvres-devaluation of sterling on 18th November 1967, the gold-
rush following British devaluation and its impact on confidence in the dollar, dollar defence 
measures, the introduction of a two-tier gold price system, rumours about the re-arrangement 
of European exchange rates=that occurred during the late 'sixties. These manoeuvres warned 
of the precariousness of international economic and financial co-operation within the frame-
work of the International Monetary Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and 
pointed to the need for tighter international monetary and economic integration. The con-
tribution that a Pacific Free Trade Area and Pacific Currency Area might make to the pro-
motion of world trade liberalisation and international monetary reform should be examined 
with this background in mind. 
In the last twenty five years, much attention has been paid to the need for increasing 
international liquidity on a global basis in order to sustain rapid expansion in world trade 
without excessive inflation. Basically, the gold-exchange system has functioned over the years 
on the premise that the United States Treasury would honour its prornises to buy gold from, 
and sell gold to, official monetary institutions in other countries at the official price ($US35 
per ounce of pure gold) and has allowed the creation of additional international liquidity in 
so far as other countries accepted the dollar, a national currency, as a means for international 
transactions. However, as dollar holdings in other countries ($US 15.7 billions with offlcial 
monetary institutions in 1967) surpassed United States' gold reserves ($US 12.1 billions in the 
same year), confidence in the dollar dwindled. The United States was forced to reduce the deficit 
in her balance of payments, and thereby, the creation of international liquidity through the 
availability of dollar reserves has been curtailed. The position in which the dollar now stands 
in relation to the international monetary system had an exact parallel in the case of sterling. 
The International Monetary Fund has operated to create international liquidity too. 
Liquidity available through the IMF is based upon the gold tranche which constitutes one 
quarter of each member's quota allocation. The creation of international liquidity by the 
Fund was, however, Iimited by the size of members quotas, which are fixed institutionally, 
and the regulations governing their use. Thus, total quotas have been increased from time 
to time and regulations governing drawings have been gradually softened. 
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In addition to these sources of liquidity, an impressive network of international credit 
arrangements, such as the General Agreement to Borrow, Roosa Bonds, the swap agreements 
between central banks and major commercial banks, has been developed partly in order to 
meet international monetary emergencies as they arose throughout the 'sixties. 
Currently, considerable faith is being placed in the creation of new international liquidity 
through the introduction of IMF Special Drawing Rights. Seventy per cent of SDRS so 
created will constitute a net addition to international liquidity, since they will be usable with-
out obligation for repayment, acceptable among members, and transferable internationally.1 
This new international liquidity, it is said, should act as a third kind of international currency. 
A fundamental characteristic of these international monetary institutions is that they all 
aim to increase international liquidity, supplementing the slow growth of monetary gold, on 
a global basis. But because the liquidity they create ultimately depends on the backing of 
monetary gold held by the United States and the IMF, the importance of which is diluted 
by the very growth of these dollar reserves, sterling reserves and IMF drawings, important 
confidence problems have resulted.2 
It is said that the creation of IMF Special Drawing Rights is a first step towards dethron-
ing gold from its central position in the international monetary system. In this respect, the 
objection of the IMF reforms is similar to that of Triffin's scheme for the establishment of 
a world central bank.3 Increases in international liquidity have certainly been welcomed in 
the past, but significantly, only to the extent that such liquidity has been solidly backed by 
monetary gold holdings. When doubts about the strength of gold backing have arisen, 
monetary crises have occurred.4 The demand for gold backing merely reflects the lack of 
international monetary integration and a parallel lack of international solidarity. A success-
fully managed international currency system must be founded on co-operation in an inter-
natio al  n society among like-minded countries possessing considerable solidarity in their political 
and economic aims. In this context, the contribution of a regional approach to the solution 
of the international monetary problem, parallelling the regional approach to trade liberalisation, 
is worth examination. 
Other roads to international monetary reform have been advocated. Some economists, 
for example, have stressed the importance of allowing exchange rates to fluctuate more freely. 
These proposals for more flexible exchange rates are essentially different in their approach 
to the international monetary problem from the proposals for a managed international currency 
system. First, they aim at eliminating or reducing the need for international liquidity and 
emphasise rapid balance of payments adjustment through exchange revaluations, thus turning 
the focus from liquidity problems to the adjustment problems. Second, they involve an 
atomistic approach in which every country engaged in foreign transactions copes independently 
with its own balance of payments difiiculties, thus turning away from the global approach 
l The best explanation of the SDR system is, so far as I am aware, in Fritz Machlup, The Rio Agree-
ment and Beyond, Remaking the International Monetary System, CED Supplementary Paper No. 24. The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968. 
2 Warning of this was given by Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, The Future of Convertibility, 
Yale University Press, 1960. 
3 Robert TrifE:n, ibid. 
4 If SDR's are created to the extent of $US 2 billions annually, they will amount to $US 10 billions in 
five years. This can be compared with about $US 40 billions worth of monetary gold in the world or 
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implicit in the managed currency solution to liquidity problems. 
Even if an exception is made of the extreme position taken by Friedman and Sohmen5 
in their advocacy of freely fluctuating exchange rates, these proposals appear quite unrealistic 
and impracticable. If there were only a limited freeing of exchange rates and they were 
allowed to fluctuate within a wider band (say 5 per cent) than at present6 or a crawling (or 
sliding) pegT allowing continual change in exchange rates were established, many disadvantages 
would remain. No single country can cope with largescale speculation against its currency 
independently. Even the 14.3 per cent British devaluation or the 11.1 per cent French devalu-
ation and 9.3 per cent German revaluation as well could not have been engineered successfully 
without considration being taken of the possibility of retaliation and the need for financial 
support by other countries. Moreover, the relevant elasticities, especially for smaller and less 
developed countries, are likely to be so small that devaluation will be ineffective in eliminating 
balance of payments deficit, or devaluation will have to be so large as to be ultimately desta-
bilising. Exchange rate fluctuations make foreign trade and investment risky, and even though 
forward exchange arbitrage eases some of these risks, they are likely to hinder the steady 
growth of international trade and investment. Thus, from the businessmen's and bankers' 
point of view, the adjustable peg system under the present IMF arrangements is to be preferred . 
There are others who advocate raising the price of gold, for example, doubling it from 
$US35 to $US70 per ounce. This would make possible a sudden increase, from $US40 
billions to $US80 billions, in international liquidity in the form of gold reserves.g The 
principal effect, it should be noted, would not come from any stimulus to gold production 
that resulted from the increase in gold price, but from the revaluation of gold reserve assets. 
The scheme for raising the price of gold has merit that does not attach to the alternative 
proposals that have been mentioned. Under alternative schemes for increasing international 
liquidity, there is the problem of how to deal with accumulated dollar and sterling reserves.9 
For example, if present dollar and sterling balances were converted into SDRS Or gold, the 
SDR scheme and gold-exchange standard would founder. Even the flexible exchange rate 
solution is made less viable because of accumulations of reserves since they provide a source 
of speculative funds. If the price of gold were doubled, on the other hand, the United States 
and the United Kingdom could liquidate accumulated dollar and sterling balances, and the 
capital-gainers may be willing to provide additional aid to less developed countries. 
The plan for raising the price of gold also has demerits. Quite apart from the fact that 
the benefits of gold revaluation would be distributed very haphazardly-indeed, in just about 
5 Milton Friedman, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in his Essays in Posilive Economics, Chi-
cago, 1953. Egon Sohmen. Flexible Exchange Rates, Chicago, 1961. Also see. Milton Friedman and 
Robert V. Roosa, The Balance ofPayments: Free Versus Fixed Exchange Rates, Washington, D.C., 1967. 
6 G.N. Halm, The 'Band' P1-0posal: the Limits of Permissible Exchange Rates Variations, Special Stu-
dies in International Economics, Princeton University, No. 6. January 1965. 
7 J.E. Meade, "The International Monetary Mechanism," The Three Banks Review, September 1964. 
J.H. Williamson, The Craw!ing Peg, Essays in International Finance, Princeton University, No. 50, 
December 1965. 
8 Gold revaluation was advocated by Roy F. Harrod, "Imbalance of• International Payments," IMF Staff 
Papers. April 1953 and explained by Jacques Rueff, "The Rueff Approach," Randall Hinshaw, ed., Monetary 
Refor'n and the Price of Gold, Alternative Approaches, The Johns Hopklns Press, 1967. 
9 This problem was explored by Zentaro Matsumura, "An Evolutronary Plan for World Monetary Re 
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the least desirable fashion imaginable-and the damage that would be done to United States 
monetary prestige, the basic objection to this plan is that it would not provide any permanent 
solution to the international monetary problem. Repeated gold revalutions would be required 
at periodic intervals and such revaluation would be associated with a temporary excess of world 
liquidity and inflationary pressures. Moreover, gold revaluation would undermine confidence 
in the key currencies, especially in countries such as Canada and Japan which hold large 
dollar reserves by gentlemen's agreement with the United States. 
II. The Effect of Reserve Pooling 
The question is whether the formation of a Pacific Currency Area can buttress the inter-
national monetary system and contribute to the solution of international monetary problems. 
A Pacific Currency Area would possess five main characteristics. Firstly, the Pacific Currency 
Area suggested here would initially include the five advanced Pacific countries, the United 
States, Canada. Japan. Australia, and New Zealand, but it would be an open-ended currency 
area into which other interested countries could be welcomed. Such a currency area would 
be established in conjunction with or prior to the formation of the Pacific Free Trade Area 
explained in earlier occasions.lo Secondly, full membership would involve the pooling of gold 
and foreign exchange reserves. Thirdly, within the currency area, member countries would 
maintain fixed exchange rates in relation to the dollar, after any initial exchange adjustments 
that are necessary were made. In effect, therefore, the Pacific Currency Area would be a 
regional Dollar Area. Fourthly, in adjustments in the Area's balance of payments vis-~-vis 
the rest of the world, the dollar's par value in terms of gold would be allowed to fiuctuate 
within a narrow band (say, 5 per cent above and below the par value). Limitation of these 
exchange fluctuations would under normal circumstances, involve the need for exchange 
equalisation operations which could be effected in terms of gold. Fifthly, the balance of 
payments among member countries could be adjusted through freer capital movement and 
changes in each country's credit with the reserve pool. 
My proposal for the establishment of a Pacific Currency Area rests on the conviction, 
shared by Mundell, that "the dollar standard that prevailed after the second world war was 
an effective standard, conducive to the rapid expansion of international trade and payments 
and consistent with economic goals both of the United States and of the countries using the 
dollar as international currency and the New York market as a source of capital. A dollar 
standard remains the best system for a large number of countries despite the gold problem 
with which the United States has recently been faced,..."Il 
The idea of a Pacific Currency Area is not unfamil[ar. A number of similar schemes 
have been put forward, but it may be worth applying the theory of the optimum currency 
area to the Pacific-Asian-Latin American region and relating it specifically to the formation 
of a Pacific Free Trade Area. 
lo See Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Developing Countries," Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics, June 1966, pp. 17-37, and "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion: PAFTA 
Re-considered," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics. June 1968, pp. 1-31. 
n Robert A. Mundell, The International Monetary System: Conflict and Reform, The Private Planning 
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A brief review of the theory of optimum currency areas is in order. A currency area 
is simply an area in which there is a common monetary unit. Ideally, perfect competition 
prevails in both commodity and factor markets, and prices throughout the area are equalised 
through competition. In other words, the common monetary unit possesses the same purchas-
ing power over commodities and factors of production within the currenc~ area. Finally, 
there is, ideally, a single monetary-fiscal authority and its monetary-fiscal policies have equi-
valent influence within the currency area . 
This is the strict definition of an optimum currency area, which is similar to the concept 
of "a country" as defined in the theory of international trade. The definition is, however, 
too strict and the concept so defined too abstract. Although a single country represents an 
optimum currency area for all practical purposes, there will be transportation costs, and 
therefore some price differences, even within a single country. Moreover, one region within 
a single country may enjoy prosperity while others suffer recessions. And one region may 
have close trade and investment ties with foreign countries while others may not. 
The concept of a country in the theory of international trade has found an extension in 
the concepts of the customs union and the free trade area. Similarly, the concept of an 
optimum currency area can be softened and extended. In the first place, a currency area 
does not necessarily require a single monetary unit but a single currency regime, or in other 
words, a fixed exchange-rate system with guaranteed currency convertibility. Commodities and 
factors of production should move much more freely within such an area and there should 
be greater similarity in prices and the purchasing power of currencies within it than outside. 
And finally, common policies with respect to the maintenance of full employment, growih, 
balanced international payments, and stable price levels, should be pursued in concert by the 
members of such a currency area . 
Although the idea of optimality is complex and difficult to quantify precisely, a well-
integrated area such as the EEC or EFTA can be thought of as an optimum currency area 
in these terms. 
An optimum currency area, either strictly or less rigidly defined, of its nature involves a 
form of discrimination. In trade theory, the existence of national frontiers implies some form 
of discrimination. The emergence of the EEC and EFTA and the existence of the British 
Preferential Area raised the question of whether such trading arrangements contradicted the 
principle of non-discrimination embodied in GATT and the IMF. In fact, of course, their 
existence is admitted under Article 24 of GATT as representing progress towards freer global 
trade. Indeed, the free trade area approach to trade liberalisation is justifiable on precisely 
the grounds that "the free trade area is the natural arrangement for a group of countries 
that wish to accelerate progress towards world free trade in the face of reluctance on the 
part of others to adopt," and "the free trade area method has the substantive advantage over 
bargaining for tariff reductions multilaterally in GATT that it promises to arrive at complete 
free trade, albeit only with other member countries, within a finite and predictable period of 
time."I2 A similar justification is applicable to the case for the currency area approach in 
relation to the global approach to monetary arrangements, since the currency area question 
is a direct extension and counterpart of the customs union or free trade area argument. 
12 Harry G. Johnson, "A New World Trade Policy in the Post-Kennedy Round Era: A Survey of Alterna-
tives, with Special Reference to the Position of the Pacific and Asian Regions," Kiyoshi Kojima, ed., 
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Thus, an optimum currency area is a well integrated monetary area which operates 
monetary-fiscal policy as if it were a single country. Firstly, within an optimum currency 
area there is a managed currency system and no gold reserves are required for intra-areal settle-
ment or currency issues. Secondly, the balance of payments vis-~-vis the rest of the world is 
settled ultimately through gold, allowing for some fluctuation of exchange rates within a nar-
row band The establishment of such currency areas would contr bute to "economising the 
use of gold" since gold reserve drains would be associated entirely with extra-areal deficits 
in the balance of payments. It can be observed how in a parallel fashion, the use of scarce 
gold supplies was economised historically by a gradual shift from the public circulation of 
gold coin to its use as~gold reserves for the banking system and then, to its use as reserves 
by a central bank or financial authority. Thus, the formation of currency areas is not in-
consistent with the pursuit of global monetary management within the framework of the gold-
exchange standard, but aims to put the present system on a sounder basis. Thirdly, a suc-
cessful currency area requires not only such solidarity as is required for the pursuit of co-
operative internal monetary-fiscal policies, the mutual accomodation of balance of payments 
vis-~-vis the rest of the world, and freer commodity and capital movements, but it also implies 
a large degree of solidarity in political objectives. Only those countries which possess such 
solidarity of purpose could establish an effective currency area. 
Let us examine more specifically the beneficial effects that might be derived from the 
formation of a Pacific Currency Area or Dollar Area. Since the Pacific Currency Areal8 
would involve the pooling of gold and foreign exchange reserves, total reserves available for 
extra-areal settlement would increase. 
(i) It can be seen that at the end of 1967, the establishment of a Pacific Currency 
Area would have increased gold reserves of $US 12.0 billion for the United States alone to 
$US13.6 billion for the area as a whole (see Table 1). This increase is not particularly 
large. It reflects the pre-condition, in which Canada and Japan had refrained from converting 
dollar reserves into gold by gentlemen's agreement. Member countries could pool reserves 
with the United States Federal Reserve System, but it would be preferable to establish a 
Pacific Reserve Bank (similar to the Bank for International Settlements at Basle). All Pacific 
Currency Area members, including the United States, would sell monetary gold to the Pacific 
Reserve Bank and deposit the receipts on which a gold guarantee and appropriate rate of 
interest would be provided'. 
(ii) At the end of 1967, the IMF reserve position was $US420 millions for the United 
States and $US 877 millions for the other four countries, amounting to $US 1,300 millions for 
the area as a whole. If members agreed to use IMF reserves through a pooling agreement, 
the maximum availability of credit through the IMF for the Pacific Currency Area as a whole 
'would be substantial. ~  (iii) Foreign exchange reserves at the end of 1967 amounted to $US 2.34 billions for the 
United States and $US 3.54 billion for the other four countries, or $US 6.2 billions for the 
Pacific Currency Area as a whole. The foreign exchange reserves of Canada ($US 1.26 billion) 
and Japan ($US 1.45 billion)14 were mainly dollar reserves, whilst those of Australia ($US 1.0 
13 Ronald I. Mckinnon recommends the formation of optimum currency area for the EEC or Western 
Europe, in his "Optimum World Money Arrangements and the Dual Currency System," Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro Quart~rly Review. Vol. 16, 1963. 
14 It is worth' noting that Japan's foreign exchange reserves have increased rapidly since 1968. 19701 A PACIFIC cuRRENCY AREA A NEW APPROACH TO 1NTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 
TABLE l. GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES 
OF THE FIVE PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
(at the end of 1967) 
($US million) 
7 
Source : IMF. International Financial Statistics. 
billion) and New Zealand ($US 0.13 billion) were mainly sterling. United States reserves com-
prised the currencies of various countries. Thus, foreign exchange reserves for extra-areal 
payments, other than in sterling, would not be large for the area as a who]e. As mentioned 
before, more than anything else, this reflects the pre-condition necessary to the establishment 
of the currency area, which would have the effect of putting existing gentlemen's agreement 
on a sounder institutional footing. 
The second benefit of forming a Pacific Currency Area would derive from economy in 
the pooling of reserves by the group of countries as a whole. Richard N. Cooper presented 
an interesting model for assessing the extent to which reserves could be economised through 
reserve pooling.15 This study covered the period 1955-1966, but here the period covered ex-
tends from 1955-1967. 
In Table 2, the standard deviation of year-to-year reserve changes in billions of U.S. 
dollars for each country is shown on the main diagonal. The sum of the standard deviations 
for all five countries amounts to $US 2.123 billion which r~presents the minimum reserve 
TABLE 2. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHANGES IN RESERVES 
1955-1967 
Note: Entries above diagonal are correlation coefficients (rij), entries along the 
diagonal are standard deviations (6t in billions of U.S, dollars), and entries below the 
diagonal are convariances (rijai6j)' 
Source of original data ' I t t ' al Financial Statistics  , n erna lon . 
15 Richard N. Cooper, "Financial Aspects of Economic Cooperation around the Pacific," in Kiyoshi 
Kojima, ed., Pactfic Trede and Develop,nent, The Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo, 1968. 8 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [February 
requirements for the separate settlement of occasional deficits in their international payments 
under the assumption that the amount of reserves required to meet these contingencies is 
directly related to the expected size of the contingencies, that is, the expected standard devia' 
tion of disturbances in the balance of payments. 
It is usual that when the payments position of the United States deteriorates, that of Japan 
or Canada tends to improve, and vice versa. Generally this relationship between balance of 
payments positions will be more usual, the closer are ties of trade and capital between two 
countries, When this relationship exists, the pooled reserves of a pair of countries is less 
liable to change than the reserves of each country separately. The entries above the diagonal 
in Table 2 record the correlation coefiicients for reserve changes of each relevant pair of 
countries. Gains from reserve pooling arise for any degree of correlation less than unity, 
but the gains increase as the correlation falls, and the maximum gains are obtained when 
the correlation is minus unity. The correlation between the United States and Japan (-0.67) 
was the highest negative correlation recorded for the period; next was that between the 
United States and New Zealand (-O.41); and the correlations between Japan and Australia, 
and the United States and Canada (both of which were -O.38) were also negatively high. 
Thus, it is clear that large absolute gains would have arisen from pooling reserves between 
these pairs of countries during the period in question. 
The absolute gains from reserve pooling are indicated by the covariances, that is, the 
product of each correlation coefficient with the two relevant standard deviations, in the entries 
recorded below the diagonal in Table 2. The standard deviation of combined reserve changes 
for the five Pacific countriesl6 would have been $US 1.25 billion, compared with the sum of 
standard deviations for the countries taken separately, which amounted to $US 2.123 billion. 
Hence, the pooling of reserves would have reduced the need to hold reserves against contin-
gent payments deficits by 41 per cent,17 '<This could represent a substantial savings, and if 
the experience of the past decade is any guide to the future, it suggests that reserve pooling 
might be mutually beneficial."IB 
III. The Effectiveness of Floating Exchange Rates 
I have suggested that in the adjustment of extra-areal payments, exchange rates should 
be allowed to float within a small band (say, 5 per cent above and below per value) and that 
this measure be supplemented by exchange equalisation operation when necessary. Another 
way of putting this would be to say that the margins on the United States' buying price and 
selling price for gold should be widened by 5 per cent either side of par value. As Mundell 
has suggested such a proposal is quite consistent with the gold-pegging clauses In the IMF 19 
le  lgebraically, the standard deviation ((T*) of combined reserve changes for n countries is given by 
the expression : 
an= 1/~ai2+2 ~ ~ nj(;ia, 
* j>i 
The expression in root will be smaller, the smaller are the correlation coefiicients rij (i,j=1, 2, ...,n.). 
a* will equal the sum of the individual standard deviation ai only if rij=1 for all i, j. 
17 This amounts to 44 per cent for the period 1955-1966 according to Richard N. Cooper, ibid., p. 299. 
18  bid., p. 299. 
19 Robert A. Mundell, The International Monetary System: Conflict and Reform, ibid., pp. 39-43, and 
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The effects of this means of adjustment in extra-areal payments for a Pacific Currency Area 
should be examined in more detail. 
Why would more flexible exchange rates be effective for a Pacific, or any such large, 
currency area, in view of our judgment that they would not be workable for a single country? 
Significantly, for a large currency area like a Pacific Currency Area, the relevant balance of 
payments elasticities would be larger than for a single country. In consequence, relatively 
large gaps in such a currency area's extra-areal balance of payments would be more readily 
adjusted through small changes in exchange rates (or gold margins). There are three main 
reasons for this. 
First, it can be expected that the price elasticity of import demand would be larger for 
the Pacific Currency Area as a whole than for each separate member country. Since ' imports 
are the excess of domestic demand over domestic production, the price elasticity of import 
demand, ~, is shown by: 
~=0( ~ e+ ~ d\/' 
where O is the elasticity of domestic prices with respect to changes in the price of competitive 
imports, and takes a constant value which depends upon the degree of product and quality 
differentiation between domestic and imported goods, the tastes of consumers, and policies 
such as buy-national-product policies; e and d are the price elasticity of demand and supply 
respectively; and P C are the ratios of domestic production and consumption to  and 
imports respectively (where C=P+M). Since O, e, and d are constant for each commodity, 
the smaller the degree of import dependence, or the larger M and the larger will be 
M' 
~, the price elasticity of import demand. 
The formation of a free trade area or an optimum currency area among a group of 
countries shifts some proportion of each member country's imports into areal production 
since some proportion of each member country's trade will be with partner countries. Thus, 
it is obvious that the ratio of production to imports for the area as a whole will be larger 
than for each member country separately. 
The more intensive intra-areal trade, the larger will be the ratio of production to imports 
for the area as a whole relative to the similar ratio for each participating country. The ratio 
of intra-areal trade to wo'rld trade for the five Pacific countries concerned was 32.5 per cent 
in 1958 and it had increased to 37.3 per cent in 1965, which compares well with the share 
of 43.5 per cent for intra-areal trade among the EEC countries. 
The results will not only be affected by the aggregate ratio of intra-areal trade to total 
trade, but also by the composition of member countries imports and exports. Take, for 
example, the case of a member country whose imports consist mainly of raw materials which 
are not produced within the area, and whose supplies are all obtained from outside the area. 
The areal ratio of production to imports will not increase for those products with the forma-
tion of a currency area. In other words, the key to effective operation of the exchange 
mechanism in this context is the extent of substitutability between areal and outside produc-
tion. In this respect, the formation of a Pacific Currency Area, which would include not 
only exporters of manufactures, such as Japan and the United States, but also major primary 
producers such as Australia and New Zealand, and the diversified Canadian economy, recom-
mends itself. Within that region there is likely to be a high degree of substitutability with 10 nITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF EcoN'oMlcs [February 
respect to outside supplies, and aggregate elasticities of import demand for outside commodi-
ties are likely to be high-much more so, for example, than for the EEC. 
It can be demonstrated, by the so-called stability condition for the balance of payments,20 
that the greater the elasticity of import demand, the more effective small changes in exchange 
rates will be in adjusting imbalance in the balance of payments.21 
Secondly, the formation of a Pacific Currency Area, if accompanied by progress towards 
a free trade area, would be associated with the growth of intra-areal trade stimulated by the 
trade creation trade diversion and dynamic effect f h trade liberalisation Trade 
dependence on the outside world would decrease relative to growing intra-areal trade depen-
dence, and the increased price elasticities of import demand would buttress the effectiveness 
of more flexible exchange rates vis-~-vis the rest of the world. 
The third reason why flexible exchange rates are likely to be more effective for a currency 
area than for a single country relates to the importance of "money illusion" . Exchange 
fluctuations are more fully effective in so far as consumers in the devaluating country resist 
downward movements in wages and prices expressed in terms of domestic currency but do 
not resist the same real changes if these are effected by changes in exchange rates. In other 
words, the argument for fiexible exchange rests on the proposition that money wages in 
domestic currency are inflexible, but that real wages are not inflexible if they are changed 
by alternation of the exchange rate. In a country which imports all of its foodstuffs and 
exports all of its output, an alteration of the exchange rate would lead to an unmediate and 
proportionate change in the cost of living, and one can assume that the real effects of these 
changes would be noticed. On the other hand, if a country imports a very small proportion 
of 't l s consumption, one would expect that an exchange rate alteration would have no per-
ceptible influence on the cost of living, at least in the short run, and would not lead to any 
general upward movement in wages and prices. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the 
larger the optimum currency area and the smaller its dependence on extra-areal trade, the 
more effective flexible exchange rates are likely to be.22 
These three factors suggest that flexible exchanges would present an effective means 
whereby a Pacific Currency Area could adjust its balance of payments vis-~-vis the rest of the 
world. The only significant problems would arises through speculative attacks upon the 
dollar, the currency area's key currency. But to meet that problem, exchange equalisation 
operations with total reserves of $US 21.1 billion or gold and IMF reserves of $US 15.0 
billion would not seem inadequate. 
20 cf. Joan Robinson, "The Foreign Exchange," in her Essays in the Theory of Employment London 
1947. The slmplest stability condition is that the sum of price elasticities of import demands in home 
and foreign countries should be greater than unity. See A. P. Lerner, The Economics of Control, New 
York 1964, p. 378. 
21 The way in which the price elasticity of export supplies would change with the formation of an 
optimum currency area may be analysed in a similar fashion. The analysis of export elasticities has not 
been undertaken here since the most important element in the effectiveness of exchange changes is the 
elasticity of import demand, rather than export supply. 
22 Cf. Robert A. Mundell, "Theory of Optimum Currency Area," American Economic Review, Septem-
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IV. Intra-areal Balance of Payments Adjustment 
Countries hold international reserves, if possible the optimum amount of reserves, so that 
they can be used as a buffer against the adverse effects of short term balance of payments 
variations on important economic policy objections, such as the pursuit of long run economic 
growth, the maintenance of full employment, and stability in the domestic price level. A 
large currency area will hold reserves for the same reasons. Such a currency area will be 
the more effective if its reserve pool is large, there is scope for economising reserves, and 
flexible exchange rates work efliciently to adjust the extra-areal balance of payments . A 
Pacific Currency Area is desirable specifically because it will help to free the pursuit of 
these important economic objectives from short run balance of payments considerations. 
The establishment of a Pacific Currency Area would have several important effects on 
the efficiency with which intra-areal settlements are made. In the first place, the cost of 
exchange transactions would be reduced since within the currency area fixed exchange rates 
would be maintained between member country currencies. More particularly, Japan presently 
settles most of her foreign exchange transactions through the United States dollar, while 
Australia and New Zealand settle most of their accounts through sterling. In the settlement 
of transactions between, say, Japan and Australia, three clearing operations are required: 
between Japanese yen and the United States dollar, between the Australian dollar and sterling; 
and between the dollar and sterling in London or New York. Each clearing demands the 
payment of some commission. Moreover, the relevant exchange rates fluctuate, even within 
the small margin of 3/4 of one per cent, and the accumulated margin in three clearing operations 
are not insignificant in businessmen's profit calculations. These extra costs would be elimi-
nated if a foreign exchange market were organised with a Pacific Currency Area so as to 
allow direct clearing between the Japanese yen and Australian dollar or between any pair of 
member country currencies. It might also be feasible to eliminate the marginal fluctuations 
of member country exchange rates around their par values, and implement a rigid fixed 
exchange rate system within the currency area. 
There are differences of view about the most efficient means of adjustment in the balance 
of payments between the member countries of an optimum currency area. James Meade 
argues that a common market or optimum currency area can work effectively only if there 
are fiexible exchange rates between the member countries, since a common market eliminates 
tariffs and import restrictions and exposes countries to much more competitive and interna-
tiona] pressure.23 Mundell and McKinnon, on the other hand, argue that a common currency 
or fixed exchange rate system is necessary for a currency area to work effectively.24 Only 
under these conditions, they assert, can there be full integration and the free movement of 
factors. Indeed, if capital is sufficiently mobile, balance of payments gaps will be filled and 
23 James E Meade "The Ca e for Vanable Exchange Rates Three Banks Review, September 1955, 
and "The Future of Internatlonal Trade and Payments " Three Banks Review. June 1961. 
24 Robert A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," American Economic Review. Sep-
tember 1961, p. 664. Ronald I McKmnon "Optrmum World Arrangements and the Dual Currency 
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flexible exchange rates become unnecessary, perhaps positively harmful.z5 
The answer to this question really turns on the extent of factor mobility, especially capital 
mobility, that prevails after the establishment of the currency area. In a Pacific Currency 
Area, the nature of payments flows, and the strength of pooled reserves, suggests that short-
term capital would flow rapidly and freely enough to accommodate balance of payments 
fluctuations. 
While a fioating exchange rate makes the integration of securities market among countries 
very difiicult, a fixed exchange rate system facilitates it and the movement of capital. Perhaps 
a 'free investment area' could be established in conjunction with a free trade area in the 
Pacific region.26 The practical importance of this notion arises out of the interest of American 
business, supported by the United States government, in direct investment overseas. In fact, 
there would be mutual gains from the liberalisation of capital movement within the Pacific 
area, although there are some major obstacles to its attainment. First, the United States 
ba]ance of payments position imposes constraints on capital outflow. Second, there is reluc-
tance bordering on fear of free capital inflow in Japan. Japan would be wise to adopt a 
more positive attitude towards capital inflow. It is likely to do this rapidly as Japanese busi-
ness begins to overcome its inferiority complex vis-~-vis American business, and as the heavy 
industrial sector in Japan strengthens its competitive position and learns from experience how 
to handle direct foreign competition. 
The mobility of capital depends upon stability in the value of currencies, which in turn 
depends upon sound monetary-fiscal policy within each country, under a managed-currency 
system with fixed intra-areal exchange rates. Since the optimum currency area as a whole 
operates as a managed currency system, the stability of currencies within the area as a whole, 
and each member country individually, depends upon the pursuit of effective incomes policies 
which hold increases in money wages in line with increases in productivity. More long term 
capital will flow to members who are successful in the pursuit of sound incomes policies, and 
will act to stimulate more rapid growth in those countries. 
Within a Pacific Currency Area, adjustments in the balance of payments between member 
countries should rely upon sound monetary-fiscal policies and the improvement of productivity 
in the long run, supplemented by short run accommodation from pooled reserves and short-
term capital movernents. As is the case within the framework of the present adjustable peg 
system, this would not prevent the re-arrangement of par values among member-country cur-
rencies should fundamental balance of payments disequilibria appear. 
V. The Effect on Economic Development 
The formation of an optimum currency area, such as that proposed for Pacific countries, 
has discriminatory effects. Member countries maintain fixed exchange rates and have arrange-
ments for accommodating payments among themselves, but exchange rates are allowed to 
25 A third view has been put by Johnson who argued that "it might be preferable for members to move 
to exchange rates fiuctuating freely in relation to the currencies of the other members as well as the 
currencies of nonmembers." Harry G. Johnson, "The Monetary Implication of a Free Trade Associa-
tion," Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, ed., A Free Trade Assotiation, New York University 
Press, 1968, p. 239. 
26 Richard N. Cooper, "Financial Aspects of Economic Cooperation around the Pacific," ibid., p. 287. 1970] A PACIFIC CURRENCY AREA: A NEW APPROACH To INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 13 
fluctuate vis-~-vis the rest of the world. The establishments of a Pacific Currency Area would 
be accompanied by the creation of a free trade area and free investment area, both of which 
would have favourable effects on investment flows within the area. But since the mobility 
of capital between different regions depends in part on stability in the value of currencies 
between them, floating exchange rate vis-~-vis the outside world would tend to discriminate 
against extra-areal investment flows. In fact, there would be investment creation, both in 
consequence of stabilising payments arrangements within the currency area and in conse-
quence of any intra-areal trade liberalisation, and 'investment diversion' both in consequence 
of floating exchange rates vis-~-vis the outside world and in consequence of the discriminatory 
removal of trade barriers.27 The elimination of trade barriers would induce enterprise to ex-
pand trade as well as investment within the area,as In this context, investment should be 
thought of not only, or even primarily, in terms of pure capital flows, that is, a shift of real 
resources from one country to another, but also in terms of the transfer of management skill 
and technical know-how. 
Neighbouring less developed countries in Asia and Latin America would almostly certainly 
become interested in a Paciffic Currency Area, and this should be welcomed. In that case, 
the original members of the currency area could co-operate in the business of '!'aid creation," 
usefully assocrated wrth "mvestment creation" m the wider Pacrfic regron, and contribute 
significantly to its economic development. 
To date, the United States has tended to look toward the possibility of ultimately 'going 
in with Europe', and has tended to neglect the Pacific region. The flow of financial reserves 
and direct investment from America to Pacific countries has lagged behind that going to 
Europe. The Pacific, Asian, and Latin American region has a huge potential for trade growth 
and development compared with Europe and the potential should be cultivated through the 
formation of a Pacific Currency Area and PAFTA. 
Balance of payments difliculties in America, especially since about 1958, have lead to in-
creased restraint on overseas investment, although important exceptions have been made in 
the Pacific area and for less developed countries, and reduced aid coupled with increasingly 
'tied' aid.29 'Tied' aid, it hardly needs saying, is frequently less economic than 'untied' aid, 
since it often obliges the recipient country to receive uncompetitive or unwanted products 
which are available much more cheaply from other sources of supply than the donor country.80 
A prime task is to devise effective international mechanism which allows donor countries, 
such as the United States, to increase aid and investment in the Pacific-Asian-Latin American 
region and 'untie' development loans without incurring balance of payments difficulties and a 
drain on gold reserves, A few years back, I suggested that this might be managed through 
27 Richard N. Cooper, "Financial Aspects of Economic Cooperation around the Pacific," ibid., p. 287. 
2B Bela Balassa, Trede Liberalization among Industrid Countries, Council on Foreign Relations, New 
York, 1967, pp. 160-161. 
29 AID aid was 41 per cent 'tied aid' in 1960, but this proportion rose to 95 per cent by 1967. See, 
AID Quarterly Report, Trend of AID Commodity Expenditures of Procurement by Resources, Washing-
ton, 1968. 
30 See, for example, Mahbub ul Haq, "Tied Credits-A Quantitative Analysis," J.H. Adler, ed., Capital 
Movements, Macmillan, New York, 1967, pp. 326-359. 14 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [February 
a 'Lent Currency Scheme,'31 the essentials of which can be implemented more conveniently 
through an extended Pacific Currency Area. 
The premise upon which my earlier proposal was based was that a major element in 
balance of payments disturbances was the leakage from grants, Ioans, and military expendi-
tures granted by one country to another but spent in a third country. This is the familiar 
transfer problem that dogged German reparations after the First World War and that has, in 
a sense, been the root cause of the American balance of payments difficulties in recent years. 
Even if one assumes, given the tying of loans that has been common, only 20 per cent of 
private capital outflows, government grants, and military expenditures were spent in third 
countries, this leakage would itself account for the major part of America's large net monetary 
deficit, resulting in the drainage of gold. My proposal is aimed at bridging these transfer 
difiiculties . 
The Pacific Reserve Bank, proposed above, could also assume the functions of a develop-
ment bank, or become the Pactfu Reserve and Development Bank. The institutional arrange-
ments necessary to these proposa]s would be as follows: 
1) When member country A from the Pacific Currency Area provides country B with , 
long-term private investment or aid funds (in the form of grants, Ioans, etc.) country B de-
posits 20 per cent of the borrowed amount with PRDB. This may be called Lent "A" Cur-
rency (that is, Lent Dollars, Lent Yen, etc.). 
2) The Lent Currency is exchangeable with an equivalent to any convertible national 
currency, and one kind of Lent Currency (say, Lent Dollars) can be exchanged for another 
(say, Lent Yen). It is not, however, convertible into gold. This prevents a drain of gold 
from lending countries. The gold guarantee is assured for Lent Currency. 
3) The Lent Currency, once deposited by the borrowing country, is used for payment 
to any country when the borrowing country imports goods and services. 
4) The borrowing country, B, is able to use currency thus acquired to make purchases 
from any country, even from outside the Currency Area, provided that the country, D, joins 
in the Pacific Currency Area Lent Currency scheme and is therefore willing to accept Lent, 
Currency. Thus PCA would be an open-ended currency area. 
5) The Lent Currency circulates in the Pacific Currency Area market as do other con-
vertible national currencies, and ultimately falls into the hands of a balance-of-payments surplus 
country (called country C) or will be deposited by such a country with PRDB. (When country 
A-the lending country-earns a balance'of-payments surplus, the Lent 'A' Currency is cleared 
automatically. There is no transfer difficulty). This means that country C, who is the net 
earner of international liquidity due to country A's lending to country B, has to refrain from , 
31  iyoshi Kojima, "A Proposal for Increasmg Internauonal Lnguidrty " The Onental Econonast  '  ugust 
1964. The proposal was reviewed by the Economist (London). July 25, 1964, pp. 401-2, under the head-
line of "How Aid Could be United." It was also recorded in Internctional Monetary Arrangements: 
The Problem of Chotce Internatronal Fmance Sectron Pnnceton Unrversity 1964, p. 88 as follow 
"Deposits of Portions of Aid or Loans Received. An alternative may of ensuring that aid and loan funds 
do not cause strain on the donors' payments balance is for a small fixed portion of such funds to be 
deposited by the recipients in special loan accounts at the IMF; and for those to be drawn on for all 
expenditures out of such loans to third countries. Countries receiving such deposits in payments for 
goods and services would be able to transfer these loan deposits for their own settlement, but could not 
convert them mto gold These loan deposits ' would be liquidated when the loans in questton were 
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converting earned Lent Currency into gold, and, instead, has to provide short-term credits 
by holding Lent Currency within the Pacific Currency Area. Thus, international liquidity 
within PCA will be augmented in the form of Lent Currency. 
6) A favourable rate of interest should be payable on Lent Currency deposited with 
PRDB. The rate of interest should be a little higher than that which is obtainable from the 
holding of other international liquidity. This arrangement would make the deposit of Lent 
Currency with PRDB more attractive than the hr:Iding of other international liquidity and 
would stimulate a gradual shift from the latter to the former. 
7) Other transfer difficulties are associated with the repayment of loans by the borrowing 
country B to the lending country A. Under normal circumstances, the Lent "A" Currency 
wi]1 be cleared in such a way that country B earns a balance-of-payments surplus and receives 
Lent "A" Currency and repays it to country A. Hence, country A does not sustain a balance-
of-payments deficit, which usually requires additional adjustment, by the amount of the return 
flow. Lent Currency efficiently fulfills its purpose in bridging, through time, the two transfer 
difiiculties accompanying the lending and repaying of long-term capital and aid transactions. 
8) If the third country, C, earns a balance-of-payments surplus in the course of the 
return flow transfer difflculties also result C t C should reduce its surplus and licluidate 
accumulated Lent "A" Currency However if country C maintains its balance-of-payments 
surplus, it will accumulate more Lent Currency and it can continue to accumulate Lent Cur-
rency just so long as it wishes, providing more credit in that form at its own risk. If country 
C does not want to accumulate more Lent Currency, it will have to adjust its balance-of-
payments out of surplus, either by increasing its own foreign investment and aid or by do-
mestic expansionary policies which increase imports. Thus, reluctance to hold Lent Currency 
stimulates an automatic adjustment mechanism in the balance-of-payments which is built into 
this proposal. 
If this scheme works successfu]ly,32 it is clear that wealthier countries, especially the 
United States, would increase the investment and aid they extend to Pacific Currency Area 
countries, without having to worry about excessive balance of payments strain and the gold 
drain. Moreover, the advanced countries within Pacific Currency Area would be able to 
provide more aid to neighbouring less developed countries without having to "tie" aid individu-
ally, although in practice they would be "tying" aid as a group to some extent. Less "tied" 
aid would almost certainly enhance the efficiency of aid.33 
8E An excellent proposal of an Asian (or ECAFE) Reserve System was presented by Robert Triffin, 
Payments Arrangements Within ECAFE Region, Yale University. Economic Growth Center Paper, No. 
114, 1967, and "International Monetary Cooperation in Asia and the Far East," Kiyoshi Kojima, ed., 
I)aclfu Trade and Development II, The Japan Economic Research Center, April 1969. Since the study 
was sponsored by the ECAFE, the Reserve System was designed for Asian developing countries and 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It might be wiser, as in our scheme, to establish PCA between five 
Pacific advanced countries and invite Asian-Latin American participation. 
33 In connection with North Atlantic Free Trade Area, Sir Roy Harrod stressed a similar view, saying 
that "It has been noted earlier that it might be expected that the NAFTA group would be like-minded 
in thinking that aid to the less developed countries should be increased. It might be possible to tie aid, 
not to the donor country, but to the NAFTA group as a whole. Thus grants provided by one NAFTA 
country would be usable in any of the NAFTA countries....  To the extent that the donor was injured 
by his funds being spent in another NAFTA country instead of in his own, this damage should be, in 
part at least offset by the arrangement for reshuffling gold outlined above." (Sir Roy Harrod, Dollar-16  }lITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  [February 
VI. Feasibility of a Pactfic Currency Area 
The desirability of a wide optimum currency area which adopted flexible exchange rates 
vis-~-vis the rest of the world was first suggested in 1963 in Brookings Report.B4 International 
monetary disturbances since then, as I have suggested above, give added emphasis to the 
need for such an arrangement for promoting closer international monetary co-operation in the 
Pacific region. Business circles recently took the initiative in establishing the Private Invest-
ment Company for Asia, capitalised with $US 40 million in March 1969. The Pacific Free 
Trade Area and Currency Area schemes have the twin aims of promoting free trade among 
the five advanced Pacific countries and of expanding aid and trade growth between those 
advanced countries and neighbouring less developed countries. The establishment of PICA 
is consistent with these aims. 
The establishment of a Pacific Currency Area depends largely on the attitude taken by 
the United States. Canada is already a defacto member of the dollar area. Japan also holds 
dollars and refrains from converting them to gold under a gentlemen's agreement with the 
United States. Australia has moved rapidly and increasingly into the Pacific financial network. 
New Zealand, whose ties with the sterling area are strongest, is also gradually changing her 
attitude towards the region. The pooling of gold and foreign exchange reserves would repre-
sent a sounder institutionalisation of growing financial co-operation in the Pacific region. 
The international credit network among the five advanced Pacific countries is already well 
developed. Japan. Canada, and Australia rely heavily upon United States capital. Although 
capital imports do not provide a very large proportion of their domestic capital formation, 
the contribution is hardly marginal. The Interest Equalisation Tax on United States purchases 
of forergn secunties and a "voluntary credit restramt program" applicable to foreign lending 
by American banks were recently introduced because of the United States balance of payments 
difficulties, although a partial exemption from these measures was accorded the Pacific region. 
There has also been co-operation in the provision of loan funds through the Asian Development 
Bank,35 The establishment of a Pacific Reserve and Development Bank which promoted 
Sterling Collaboration, Basisfor Jnitiative, The Atlantic Trade Study, London, 1967, p. 67.) The arrange-
ment for reshuffling gold means that "The NAFTA countries could agree that each one of their own 
gold holdings should rise or fall in the same proportion, quite irrespective of their individual balance of 
payments. This could be achieved by a swapping of gold against currencies within the group." (Ibid., 
pp. 65-66). The reserve pooling in our Pacific Currency Area scheme may satisfy more completely this 
kind of condition. 
34 "The best alternative to a system of fixed rates with provision for increasing liquidity, in our view, 
would be a modified system of flexible exchange rates consisting of a dollar-sterling bloc and an EEC 
bloc. There would be relatively fixed rates within each bloc and flexible rates between them. Adoption 
of this system would imply cutting the tie between gold and the dollar." Walter Salant and Associates, 
The United States Balance of Payments in 1968, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1963, p. 
259. 
35 The Asian Development Bank could perform the function of a Lent Currency Scheme if its member-
ship were extended appropriately to embrace those countries designed by the scheme. In that case, the 
task of a Pacific Bank would be confined to the pooling of reserves and other measures which are neces-
sary for a Pacific Currency Area. However, since it would not be easy for the Asian Development Bank 
to embrace Latin American countries, only a part of the function of a Lent Currency Scheme could be 
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economic development in the Pacific-Asian-Latin American region through increased aid and 
investment would be a further step in the same direction. A regional code of overseas in-
vestment and aid would also be adopted if it seemed desirable. 
One question that arises in whether PCA's establishment presupposes the establishment 
or strengthening of other currency areas, such as a European Currency Area, the Sterling 
Area, and the Rouble Area at the same time.B6 1 believe that the establishment of a Pacific 
Currency Area can be proceeded with independently of the establishment or strengthening of 
other currency areas. Even a single country represents one optimum currency area. Though 
the arguments presented here for the establishment of PCA apply to other areas, they should 
decide what is best in their own political and economic interests. 
The position of sterling and the Sterling Area is another matter. Should Britain join a 
Dollar Area or a European Currency Area ? Should the Sterling Area attempt to strengthen 
itself independently ? The currency area alternatives for Britain are similar to the free trade 
area alternatives . 
If PCA were established, it would be better if the United States did not raise the price 
of gold since a large share of dollar balances is held by PCA countries. The problem be-
comes how much of the dollar balances held by the rest of the world would seek gold con-
version. Triff:n has estimated that excessive dollar holdings in the EEC stood at $US 3.65 
billion at the end of September 1966.3T Even though this account will have risen since 1966, 
only some part of it would seek conversion, and PCA's pooled reserves and flexible exchange 
rates vis-~-vis the outside world should be adequate to cope with the contingency. 
The prospects for both a Pacific Currency Area and PAFTA depend largely on United 
States attitudes. The proposals represent an outward-looking, non-isolationist alternative for 
the new United States' Administration. 
s6 The Brookings Report supposes, as in the prcvious note, a dollar-sterling bloc and an EEC bloc. 
McKinnon argues for a dual currency world between the Western Europe (with the possible exception 
of Britain) and North America. R.1. McKmnon "Optnnum World Monetary Arrangements and the Dual 
Currency Systems," ibid., pp. 379-85. Mundell expects three blocs to emerge saying that "the result 
might be a monetary division of the free world into the sterling area (much of the old British Common-
wealth, Scandinavia, and the Middle East), the thaler area (composed of Continental Europe and some 
of Africa), and the dollar area (the United States, Japan, Canada, most of Latin America, and parts of 
the rest of the world)." Robert A. Mundell, The International Monetary System: Conflict and Rejorm, 
ibid., pp. 47-8. 
B7 Robert Triffin, Our International Monetary System, Yesterday, ~roday, and Future, Random House, 
New York, 1968, p, 153. 